# Cedar

An open, formally analyzable policy language. Highflame authors authorization policy in Cedar and enforces the same policy at every boundary an agent crosses.

Learn more: [Agent Authorization](/content/learn/ai-agent-authorization/index.html)

Part of [the Agent Control Fabric](/content/platform/index.html): Highflame's identity, policy, and enforcement substrate for AI agents.

## Keep exploring the glossary.

### CIBA
Client-Initiated Backchannel Authentication: an out-of-band flow that pauses a sensitive agent action for explicit, attributable human approval.

### Code agent
Autonomous software that reads code, runs commands, calls tools, and changes systems on a developer's behalf. Securing one means controlling what it can access while it runs, and proving afterward what it did.

### Confused deputy
An attack where a low-privilege agent tricks a higher-privilege one into acting on its behalf. Scope attenuation prevents it: a sub-agent provably cannot exceed its parent's authority.

### Delegated authority
The model where an agent acts on behalf of a human or another agent, holding strictly less authority than the principal that authorized it, and provably distinct from that principal.

### Delegation depth
How many on-behalf-of hops a credential sits from its original human authorizer. Highflame enforces depth as a first-class policy primitive.

### DPoP
Demonstrating Proof-of-Possession (RFC 9449): binds a token to a proof key so a stolen token is inert without it.